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BOOK REVIEWS
GOVERNMENT PRICE-FIXING. By Jules Backman. New York and Chicago:
Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1938. Pp. xi, 304.
This book should be reviewed by a passionate partisan, for one who is
inclined neither to bark at business nor to growl at government is going to
find that anything he may say will be used against him.
The author's own position toward government price-fixing is as clear as
Coolidge's (apocryphal) pastor's was toward sin: "He's against it." He
strives rather visibly at times to maintain a dispassionate attitude toward
the problem but cannot suppress his feelings. To choose a few selections
seriatim: "The very essence of recent developments has been the expansion
of personal government";1 "But the difference between fighting an external
enemy and attempting to cure a depression are [sic] so obvious as to need
little comment"; 2 "A program of scarcity cannot be the road to the 'more
abundant life' ";3 "It is always well to keep in mind that there are two
things which the price-fixers have never been able to control: Mother Na-
ture and human nature";4 "The farmers approved of the experiment [cot-
ton control under the Bankhead Bill] * * * not because of a desire to be
subjected to restriction or bureaucratic control, but rather because of the
'bribes' in the form of special payments which were offered to them in
exchange for giving up their freedom of action";5 "The petty difficulties
that arose during the life of the N. R. A. can be cited as an example of a
situation in which many bureaucrats were so drunk with their power of
life and death over an industry, that the business man was often prevented
from running his business as he saw fit";6 "As compared with [the com-
petitive price] * * * system, there is that of fixed prices based upon ethical
or political values. The automatic, if imperfect, working of a competitive
system is displaced by arbitrary decisions"; 7 "To regiment the producers
alone is not sufficient. The consumers must also be told what they can eat,
wear and do." s The adjectives "regimented" and "arbitrary" suffer from
overwork. This point of view may be entirely valid; certainly it is held by
many responsible doers and capable thinkers; nevertheless it is proper to
recognize that the author does possess and express a definite point of view
before proceeding to examine his evidence and his conclusions.
What the book purports to do is to review a number of the more im-
portant price-fixing experiments of the twentieth century on the basis of
their objectives, their processes, and their results, and to determine "the
pitfalls involved in connection with price controls and, wherever possible,
suggest means of avoiding them or minimizing their ill effects." 9 The
descriptive parts of the work are on the whole of a high order-succinct,
1. P. vi.
2. P. 36.
3. P. 96.
4. P. 99.
5. P. 243.
6. P. 246.
7. P. 271.
8. P. 276.
9. P. 15.
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clear, well-organized. Occasionally they rise to heights almost of brilliance,
considering the complexity of the details and the terseness of their exposi-
tion; such portions of the book as Chapter 3, describing the multiform con-
trols evolved under the N. R. A. and the evolution of administrative policy
in that connection, and Chapter 8, describing the perhaps insuperable diffi-
culties in the way of using cost of production as a basis for price-fixing,
deserve unreserved praise. The examples chosen cover a wide range of
commodities and communities, and yet the reviewer cannot help feeling that
some of the most interesting examples, which the author should have noted
especially because they rather militate against his general conclusions, have
escaped his attention; for example, the elaborate Australian experiment
which received its deathblow in James v. Commonwealth of Australal o and
the New Zealand marketing programs which at last reports11 are still con-
tinuing with undiminished vigor. However, the book does illustrate a very
generous sampling of experiments in price control, and it would perhaps
be unreasonable to demand that every one of the multitudinous instances
be included in what after all is intended to be a representative rather than
a compendious discussion.
It is when one turns from the descriptive and analytical phases of the
discussions to the critical that the blemishes occasioned by the author's
staunch adherence to personal predilections, indicated in the excerpts al-
ready quoted, make themselves manifest. Just here, fortunately for present
purposes, is the place where the economic and legal issues fuse and where the
book most lends itself to criticism by one whose qualifications lie rather in
the domain of the law than in the field of economics.
The problems of price-fixing, it need hardly be stated, are among that
numerous class of matters in the current world which are neither purely
legal nor purely economic, but involve the interrelations of government and
business. Of these two disciplines, it is obvious upon a reading of his dis-
cussion that Professor Backman is acquainted only with the latter. His con-
cession of a peculiar status to the transportation industry on the ground
that its components are "public utilities," with apparent unawareness of
the decision or the implications of the Nebbia Case;1 2 his assumption that
ease of determination of the period of operation of wartime controls differ-
entiates them significantly from peacetime price measures, in happy dis-
regard of the complexities attending the question of when a war is over;13
his failure to mention at any place in his numerous references to the deci-
sions holding N. R. A. and A. A. A. unconstitutional that these decisions
were not based on the issue of price-fixing as such, with its tendency to
lead the non-lawyer reader to the impression that that was the ground of
decision-in such details as these there is revealed a lack of intimate ac-
quaintance with the legal materials in the field. Probably it would equally
become the reviewer to stick to his last, since he professes to no greater
10. [1936] A. C. 578.
11. See (1938) 112 The Round Table 864, 865.
12. Nebbia v. New York (1933) 291 U. S. 502.
13. See Ft. Frances Pulp & Paper Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. [1923]
A. C. 695, 703 et seq.
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erudition in economics than one must have to understand the law nowadays.
Only a settled conviction that the subject dealt with in the book under re-
view involves matters which call for conjoint application of legal and eco-
nomic doctrines has induced him to venture suggestions, or at least queries,
of an economic character along with his legal remarks.
Professor Backman's book presupposes the orthodox economic argument
that the free play of supply and demand is the only permanently sound
device for price adjustment; that much may be granted arguendo. It further
presupposes that there has at some time in the tolerably near past been
something approaching the free market conditions, the undistorted supply-
demand relationship, on which classical economic theory is predicated. Can
that be granted? The evidence to that effect is by no means conclusive. The
disruptions of the market caused by the commanding position which the
large corporation has taken in twentieth-century America have been ably
set forth by Berle and Means 14 (in as happy a collaboration, incidentally,
as economics and law have to their credit to date); and the studies of
Chamberlin"S and of Robinson-6 (not to mention others appearing in peri-
odical publication) lend powerful support to the conclusion that, like it or
not, we are not currently and have not been for some time in the past living
under a regime of free competition (if indeed that condition ever prevailed
outside the textbooks). True, Professor Backman recognizes that there is
a good deal of private price-fixing (and disapproves of it), but his stric-
tures on government price-fixing disregard this state of facts and proceed
on the plane that it uniformly represents an interference with the operation
of economic laws in the free market.
Conspicuously, private price-controls have been in the industrial field;
as to finished goods, it may be very seriously questioned whether on the
whole we are not today closer to oligopoly than to free competition. Con-
spicuously, government price-fixing has been concerned with agricultural
products--"primary producers' marketing," as the British dominions have
descriptively labelled some of their legislation. Now the Brookings Insti-
tution's studies have taught us that the income of farm families is dispro-
portionately below that of the population generally and that to a very
great extent farm income falls below the amounts necessary for a minimum
adequate standard of living;17 that periods of prosperity are typically pre-
ceded by, and necessarily accompanied by and conditioned on, the mainte-
nance of consumption at a high level ;18 that consumption expenditures are
relatively to income much greater among the lower income groups than
among those in the higher brackets; 9 and that comparatively small in-
creases of uniform character in the income of low income recipients would
14. The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933) especially at
345 et seq.
15. The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933).
16. Economics of Imperfect Competition (1936).
17. See Leven, Moulton, and Warburton, America's Capacity to Consume
(1934) especially at pp. 58-62.
18. See Moulton, The Formation of Capital (1936) 26-48.
19. Leven, Moulton, and Warburton, supra, note 17, at 91-99.
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provide added demand for consumption goods sufficient to take up all the
slack currently existing in productive capacity.20 If these findings are to be
accepted as true, is there not much to be said, even from an economic stand-
point, for the proposition that governmental action to produce increases of
income among a numerically important low-income group will produce bene-
fits to the community generally, vastly in excess of the immediate incon-
venience entailed on the non-farming class by establishing or maintaining
agricultural prices on an artificial level? Professor Backman's argument
might be that the farmers, under the compulsion of a want of demand for
their products sufficient to recompense them, will turn to other pursuits,
thus cutting down on agricultural production and so producing a natural
price increase. The reluctance of agricultural workers to move into other
occupations and the tendency of agricultural production not only to main-
tain itself but actually to increase under the impact of low unit prices are,
however, notorious.21 Furthermore while the farmer has sold in the past
in a free competitive market, he has as to many items had to buy in a
market where prices were fixed by private action of industrial sellers.
Ideally, it may not be desirable to counterbalance rigid prices of finished
or semi-finished goods, industrially fixed, by rigid prices of primary prod-
ucts, governmentally fixed; but the better method of removing all the con-
ditions which promote or permit disruptions in the pricing process is hardly
a practical ptogram for the predictable future. In the actualities of present
economic and governmental organization, is there not a good deal to be
said for the utilization of a carefully devised system of governmental price-
interventions in favor of agriculture to redress the unbalance produced by
extragovernmental price controls affecting finished goods? Certainly it
would seem that Professor Backman has too generally ignored the possible
function of government price-fixing as a corrective for non-governmental
price-fixing, even were no considerations of a non-economic character in-
volved.
Moreover, the author seems committed to the view that government
should limit itself to passivity and inaction where matters of economic im-
port are concerned, to the view that "that government is best which governs
least." This view is commonly held by the orthodox economists, but it is
quite generally discredited in the juristic thought of the present day. The
functions of government are not currently conceived of by any responsible
group of legal thinkers as those merely of an umpire in a knock-down-and-
drag-out fight with no holds barred. Long before economic planning was
either watchword or bugaboo, the Preamble of the Constitution included
as one of the purposes of government the promotion of the general welfare.
Delimitation of the areas within which particular claims are to be recog-
nized and others to be disregarded in order to assure a tolerable distribu-
tion of social benefits among all the citizens is a proper task of govern-
20. Id. at 115-124.
21. See Galbraith and Black, The Maintenance of Agricultural Produc-
tion During Depression: The Explanations Reviewed (1938) 46 J. Pol. Econ.
305.
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ment, not a matter which it is bound to let slip from its nerveless hands
to be regulated by purely economic forces. Even if, then, no basis whatever
existed for thinking that maladjustments would be redressed to a sounder
ultimate result by government price-fixing, it is in accord with the whole
trend of jurisprudence today to recognize the right of government to effect
such an adjustment of benefits among the citizens as will secure on the
whole the fullest recognition of claims to minimal human rights, whether
this adjustment be made directly by taxes, indirectly by price regulation,
or in any other effective manner. The issue is not one of propriety but one
of effectiveness.
However, it can hardly be gainsaid that there has been much in the
record of price fixing to date that is futile and much that is foolish. Ill-
conceived and ill-executed plans have perhaps predominated. Rejection of
the author's argument as to the inherent evils of price regulation involves
no denial of the fact that he has collected much instructive material for the
determination of the form which price-interventions can and should take.
The evidence which he has accumulated is powerful to demonstrate that
such regulation works best where it is of an emergency or temporary
character; that it is a more usable device in connection with agricultural
products than elsewhere, and perhaps that class of commodities is the only
one as to which it can be employed; that control of prices almost necessarily
demands a concomitant control over production; that the hopes for success
vary materially, depending on how significant a proportion of the total
supply is needed to fill the home demand and how much is an export com-
modity. The list of issues to which he directs attention cannot be exhausted
in the brief space of a review. The flexibility which he notes as a feature
of the relatively more successful price experiments also will indicate to the
lawyer that here we have another of the situations calling for the con-
tinual supervision of an expert administration body rather than for handling
through the cruder devices of detailed legislation. In its suggestions for the
direction which price fixing may take, as well as in its accumulated evi-
dence on past price-regulation, the book is a useful aid to modern thinking
in the field of government and law; only its assumptions and conclusions
are fraught with danger and they only for the unwarned or the unwary.
ALBERT SALISBURY ABEL.t
t Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University.
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